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CVE-2026-84313 high CVSS 8.8

Authentication Bypass in Nginx-UI (CVE-2026-84313)

Summary

Authentication bypass in Nginx-UI (CVE-2026-84313). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. Exploitable via POST /api/otp_enroll. Mitigation: upgrade to 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 or later.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Summary

Endpoints that bind a TOTP secret (POST /api/otp_enroll) or register a WebAuthn passkey (POST /api/finish_passkey_register) for the current user require only a valid JWT. There is no current-password re-prompt and the routes are explicitly registered outside the RequireSecureSession() group. With only a stolen JWT, an attacker can attach their own second factor to the victim's account, surviving any subsequent password rotation and locking the legitimate user out.

Details

api/user/router.go:34-39 — note the routes registered before the secure-session group:

r.GET("/otp_secret", GenerateTOTP)
r.POST("/otp_enroll", EnrollTOTP)                     // ← outside RequireSecureSession
r.GET("/begin_passkey_register", BeginPasskeyRegistration)
r.POST("/finish_passkey_register", FinishPasskeyRegistration)  // ← outside RequireSecureSession

o := r.Group("", middleware.RequireSecureSession())
{
    o.GET("/otp_reset", ResetOTP)                     // reset *is* protected — inconsistent
    ...
}

EnrollTOTP (api/user/otp.go:45-102) only refuses if cUser.EnabledOTP() is already true; for any victim who has never enabled TOTP it accepts an attacker-supplied Secret and Passcode pair (the validator only checks that the passcode is a valid TOTP for the supplied secret — i.e., the attacker proves they know the secret they are submitting):

if cUser.EnabledOTP() { ... abort ... }
var twoFA struct {
    Secret   string `json:"secret…

Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-84313 has been found in Nginx-UI.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /api/otp_enroll over the network to misuse the product.
Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover. CVSS score: 8.8/10.
What to do: upgrade Nginx-UI to 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 or later.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "Nginx-UI CVE-2026-84313" on the vendor's site.

CVE-2026-84313 (Nginx-UI) — CWE-287 / CVSS v3 8.8
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / no user interaction
Attack surface: POST /api/otp_enroll / POST /api/finish_passkey_register / GET /api/begin_passkey_register / EnrollTOTP
Patched: 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 — apply immediately
Workaround: None reliable.
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

Authentication bypass (CWE-287) exists in Nginx-UI. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /api/otp_enroll.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of Nginx-UI. Attack surface: POST /api/otp_enroll / POST /api/finish_passkey_register / GET /api/begin_passkey_register / EnrollTOTP.

🔥 Severity

Severity: High (CVSS 8.8/10). Successful exploitation can lead to full system takeover.

🔧 How to fix

Update to 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0.

🛡️ Workaround

Workaround: None reliable.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /api/otp_enroll requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Run grep -r 'Nginx-UI' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

  1. 1
    Identify exposure identify 
    grep -r 'Nginx-UI' . | grep -v node_modules

    リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で Nginx-UI を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。

  2. 2
    Hunt for indicators of compromise detect 
    grep 'POST /api/otp_enroll' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'

    アクセスログで POST /api/otp_enroll への異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。

  3. 3
    Apply temporary workaround mitigate 
    None reliable.

    パッチが適用されるまでの応急処置として、None reliable. を実施。回避策の副作用 (機能低下) を確認した上で。

  4. 4
    Apply patch patch 
    Upgrade Nginx-UI to 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0

    ステージング環境で 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 に上げて回帰テスト → 本番反映。回帰テストはアプリの主要ハッピーパスと、Step 2 で見つけた異常検知の続報チェックを含めること。

  5. 5
    Post-deployment verification verify 
    Replay attack against POST /api/otp_enroll on staging to confirm patch closes the vector

    パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。

Affected packages

go Nginx-UI
[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0"}]}]

References

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