External control of file name or path and uncontrolled resource consumption in Apache bRPC ...

External control of file name or path and uncontrolled resource consumption in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers who can reach the builtin service port to create directories and truncate/overwrite files with the privileges of the server process, or to hold the process-wide CPU/contention profiler for an arbitrarily long time.

Root Cause:

1. The builtin /flags service allows gflags carrying a validator to be modified at runtime via ?setvalue=. The bvar/mbvar dump path gflags (bvar_dump_file, bvar_dump_tabs, mbvar_dump_file) were registered with an accept-anything validator whose only purpose was to wake the dumping thread. A remote attacker could therefore repoint the dump path (e.g. GET /flags/bvar_dump_file?setvalue=/victim/dir/target followed by GET /flags/bvar_dump?setvalue=true, or the equivalent for mbvar_dump_file, which is used verbatim without a forced suffix), making the dumping thread recursively create directories and open/truncate files at attacker-chosen locations. Tab names in bvar_dump_tabs were appended to the path without sanitization, allowing '..' to escape the configured directory.
2. The /pprof builtin service did not clamp the ?seconds= parameter to FLAGS_max_profiling_seconds (a limit that /hotspots enforced). A single request such as ?seconds=2147483647 made the handler sleep for decades while holding the process-wide gperftools CPU profiler or bthread contention profiler, so /hotspots/cpu and /hotspots/contention…