SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) in Eclipse Che (CVE-2026-86590)
Summary
SSRF in Eclipse Che (CVE-2026-86590). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via POST /dashboard/api/data/resolver.
Original description
The description as published by the source.
In Eclipse Che versions 7.79.0 through 7.121.0, the dashboard backend's POST /dashboard/api/data/resolver endpoint passes a caller-supplied URL directly to an outbound HTTP GET request with no host filtering. An authenticated user can exploit this server-side request forgery (SSRF) to read responses from internal network addresses, including the cloud instance metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback interfaces, RFC-1918 private ranges, and in-cluster Kubernetes services. The operator-configured allowlist (spec.devEnvironments.allowedSources.urls) is not consulted. The vulnerability is fixed in version 7.122.0, which adds private-address blocking, IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypass prevention, operator allowlist enforcement, and disables HTTP redirects on the outbound request.
Source: NIST National Vulnerability Database NVD GitHub Advisory
Auto-generated summary
Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.
A vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-86590 has been found in Eclipse Che.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like POST /dashboard/api/data/resolver over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "Eclipse Che CVE-2026-86590" on the vendor's site.
CVE-2026-86590 (Eclipse Che) — CWE-918
Attack surface: POST /dashboard/api/data/resolver
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.
SSRF (CWE-918) exists in Eclipse Che. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via POST /dashboard/api/data/resolver.
Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of Eclipse Che. Attack surface: POST /dashboard/api/data/resolver.
Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.
Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.
Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual POST /dashboard/api/data/resolver requests with malformed payloads or SQL meta-characters. Audit SBOM/dependencies to find affected services.
Response actions
Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order
-
1Identify exposure identify
Audit SBOM/dependencies for affected components.資産台帳・SBOM・依存マニフェストで Eclipse Che を使っているサービスとバージョンを洗い出す。
-
2Hunt for indicators of compromise detect
grep 'POST /dashboard/api/data/resolver' /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -E '(unusual_payload|sqli_pattern)'アクセスログで
POST /dashboard/api/data/resolverへの異常なリクエスト (不正な認証ヘッダ・SQLメタ文字)を過去 30〜90日分捜索。WAF/SIEM があれば該当パスのアラート発火履歴を確認。 -
3Post-deployment verification verify
Replay attack against POST /dashboard/api/data/resolver on staging to confirm patch closes the vectorパッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番では Step 2 と同じログクエリでアラート再発が無いか継続監視。
References
- web github.com
- web gitlab.eclipse.org
- web nvd.nist.gov
- web github.com