In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Fix integer overflow in mr_check_range() leading to OOB access mr_chec...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Fix integer overflow in mr_check_range() leading to OOB access mr_check_range() validates that [iova, iova+length) falls within the registered MR range using wraparound-prone arithmetic: if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova || iova + length > mr->ibmr.iova + mr->ibmr.length) A remote peer can craft an RDMA-Write/Read RETH so that iova + length wraps to 0 (e.g. iova=0xfffffffffffffff8, length=8), bypassing the check. rxe_mr_iova_to_index() then computes a huge index (int idx, only guarded by WARN_ON) and rxe_mr_copy_xarray() dereferences mr->page_info[huge], causing an out-of-bounds read/write and a kernel oops that is triggerable by an unauthenticated remote peer. Rewrite the check in overflow-safe form; the first two clauses guarantee that the subsequent subtractions do not underflow: if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova || length > mr->ibmr.length || iova - mr->ibmr.iova > mr->ibmr.length - length) With the fix, mr_check_range() returns -EINVAL for the crafted iova and the responder reports REMOTE_ACCESS_ERROR instead of triggering the OOB.