Vulnerability in netty (UBUNTU-CVE-2026-41417)

Summary

Vulnerability in netty (UBUNTU-CVE-2026-41417). Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure. Exploitable via DefaultHttpRequest.

Original description

The description as published by the source.

Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a DefaultHttpRequest or DefaultFullHttpRequest is created first and its URI is later changed via setUri(). The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but setUri() does not apply the same validation. HttpRequestEncoder and RtspEncoder then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches setUri(), this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests, leading to HTTP request smuggling or desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

Source: OSV.dev (Open Source Vulnerabilities) OSV

Auto-generated summary

Assembled by SecPulse from the source data (CVSS, CWE, affected versions) using templates — no AI involved. Check the original description and references below for exact details.

A vulnerability tracked as UBUNTU-CVE-2026-41417 has been found in netty.
Attackers can target a specific entry point like DefaultHttpRequest over the network to misuse the product.
Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.
What to do: apply the vendor's official patched release.
If unsure, ask your IT team or search "netty UBUNTU-CVE-2026-41417" on the vendor's site.

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-41417 (netty)
Attack vector: remote (network-reachable) / unauthenticated / no user interaction
Attack surface: DefaultHttpRequest / DefaultFullHttpRequest / HttpRequestEncoder / RtspEncoder
Plan: 1) Audit SBOM/dependencies, 2) Stage→prod upgrade, 3) Add WAF/proxy monitoring on affected endpoints, 4) Hunt IOCs in logs.
Refs: see the GHSA / vendor advisory / patched release linked on this page.

❓ What is the problem

A vulnerability (unclassified) exists in netty. Attackers reach the vulnerable code path via DefaultHttpRequest without authentication.

📍 Affected scope

Check the vendor advisory for the affected versions of netty. Attack surface: DefaultHttpRequest / DefaultFullHttpRequest / HttpRequestEncoder / RtspEncoder.

🔥 Severity

Severity: ?. Risk of unauthorized operations or information disclosure.

🔧 How to fix

Update to the patched release per vendor advisory.

🛡️ Workaround

Until the patch is applied: disable the affected feature, apply WAF rules, or restrict access via network ACLs.

🔍 Detection

Search webserver/proxy logs for unusual request patterns matching this CVE's known IOCs. Run grep -r 'netty' . against your dependency files (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.sum) to find affected services.

Response actions

Concrete steps and command examples for SOC/SRE teams to execute in order

1
Identify exposure identify
```
grep -r 'netty' . | grep -v node_modules
```
リポジトリと本番環境の依存ファイル (package-lock.json / requirements.txt / go.sum / Gemfile.lock 等) で netty を grep し、稼働しているサービス・バージョンを把握する。
2
Post-deployment verification verify
```
Confirm patched version is live in production
```
パッチ適用後、ステージングで PoC または同等の悪用パターンを再現して脆弱性が閉じたことを確認。本番ではアクセスログ・WAF でアラート再発が無いか継続監視。